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R478part of the same harmonic series. The
shifted harmonic is perceptually
segregated from the rest of the
complex and has little effect on
the overall pitch [11].
So although preference for
harmonicity may be dependent on
musical experience, the use of
harmonicity in auditory processing is
probably not dependent on this
specific experience. Instead its use is
driven by the adaptation of the auditory
system to the acoustic properties of
objects in the environment. The
preference for consonance reflects the
central role of harmonicity in auditory
perception, both for the identification
of sounds and for the segregation of
sounds from different sound sources.References
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Affect Empathic Neural Responses?How does race affect the human ability to share and respond to the suffering of
others? Recent evidence provides novel insight into how and why race alters
empathic neural response.Figure 1. To understand the experience of
racial discrimination, Griffin, a white native
from Texas, artificially darkened his skin.Joan Y. Chiao and Vani A. Mathur
In 1959, John Howard Griffin ingested
anti-vitiligo drugs which transformed
the color of his skin fromwhite to black,
and then travelled through the racially
segregated South for the first time from
the perspective of a Black man
(Figure 1). In his memoir ‘Black Like
Me’, Griffin would later remark, ‘‘I had
no idea what they [Blacks] have to go
through. I literally bawled myself to
sleep some nights. I learned that when
it is night, when it is dark, then the
Negro feels safest. Langston Hughes’s
line, ‘Night coming tenderly/ Black like
me’, has real meaning’’.
How and why does race affect our
ability to understand and share the
suffering of others? Race is a potent
modulator of neural responses
underlying social behavior [1,2]. Prior
neuroimaging research has
demonstrated that racial majority
group members, such as Whites (in the
US), show greater fusiform and
parahippocampal response when
perceiving own-race faces [3], and
either heightened [4] or attenuated [5,6]
amygdala response to other-race
faces, depending on social contextand presence of unconscious racial
bias [7–9]. By contrast, members of
racial minority groups, such as Blacks,
typically demonstrate greater fusiform
[3] as well as amygdala activation to
own-race faces [4], suggesting that
intergroup status moderates the
direction and magnitude of neural
responses to ingroup and outgroup
members [3–6].
Most recently, studies of race and
social brain functioning have focused
on the neural basis of intergroup
empathy [10–12]: in particular, a study
reported in this issue ofCurrent Biology
[10] using transmagnetic stimulation
(TMS) reveals for the first time greater
empathic sensorimotor contagion
when observing the physical suffering
of subjects of the same race, but not
those of other races.
Multiple Routes to Empathy
Empathy is the capacity to understand
and share the emotional states of
others and serves as a key motivator
and the proximate mechanism of
altruistic behavior, whereby an
individual perceives and shares in the
distress of another person, and acts to
reduce his or her suffering [13].Convergent evidence suggests the
existence of multiple routes to our
ability to understand and share the pain
of another, including sensorimotor
contagion, affect sharing and cognitive
perspective-taking or appraisal [14].
During sensorimotor contagion,
seeing a painful sensorimotor
experience in another person, such as
a needle penetrating another’s hand,
elicits an isomorphic sensorimotor
experience in the observer — for
example, muscle-specific freeze within
the same region of the observer’s hand
[15]. By contrast, during affect sharing,
seeing the emotional pain of another
person, such as a painful facial
expression, elicits a shared affective
experience, while during cognitive
perspective-taking, the capacity to
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Figure 2. Empathic sensorimotor contagion as a function of race.
(A) Black and White participants observe a needle penetrating a specific muscle in a Black,
White or Violet hand. (B) For Black and White participants, MEP inhibition is greater for ingroup
relative to outgroup hands. (C) Unconscious racial bias predicts degree of ingroup bias in
empathic sensorimotor contagion. (Adapted from [13].)
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R479take another’s perspective facilitates
shared emotional experience [14,16].
The former route to empathy is thought
to occur automatically and without
conscious awareness of one’s own
emotional state, whereas the latter
routes reflect conscious empathic
experience and are modulated by
top-down contextual factors.
Empathic Neural Response for
Same but not Other Races
Prior studies of sensorimotor
contagion using TMS have shown that
muscle-specific motor-evoked
potentials (MEPs) are inhibited when
participants observe the physical
suffering of another, such as watching
a needle penetrating a specific muscle
[15]. In their recent study, Avenanti,
et al. [10] found that both Black and
White participants showed greater
muscle-specific corticospinal inhibition
when watching a needle penetrate the
hand, but only when the hand was
a person of the same race, indicating
an ingroup bias in the activation of pain
representations within the perceiver’s
sensorimotor system (Figure 2A).
Intriguingly, ingroup biases in
empathic neural response appeared
to occur as a function of culturally
acquired racial prejudice, rather than
an automatic sensorimotor preference
to respond to the physical suffering of
same-race targets. When Black and
White participants in their study were
shown a needle penetrating the hand of
a different, but culturally unfamiliar
race target, such as a Violet hand,
greater sensorimotor contagion was
still observed. They found that
unconscious racial bias modulated the
extent to which corticospinal inhibition
was preferential for same-race targets
(Figure 2B). Moreover, participants
who showed greater unconscious
racial bias, as measured by the implicit
association test, showed greater
ingroup bias in corticospinal inhibition
(Figure 2C). Taken together, their
results suggest that an empathic neural
response to the physical suffering of
others occurs readily, but unconscious
racial prejudice can lessen the extent to
which empathy for other race targets
occurs and persists.
In addition to sensorimotor
contagion, empathic neural response is
facilitated by affect sharing, cognitive
perspective taking and appraisal
[14,16,17]. A distinct neural pain matrix,
including bilateral anterior insula (AI)
and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)[14,16,17], is thought to underlie the
affective components of empathy. AI
and ACC code the autonomic and
affective dimension of pain and, in
particular, the subjective experience of
empathy when perceiving pain or
distress in others [14,16,17]. The
affective empathic neural response
varies among individuals, depending
on factors such as the degree to which
one prefers social hierarchy over
egalitarianism [18]. Cognitive
components of empathy, such as the
capacity to take another person’s
perspective, are thought to rely on
subregions of medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC) [19]. Hence, the capacity to
understand and share another’s pain is
supported by sensorimotor (for
example, contagion), affective (for
example, affect resonance) and
cognitive (for example, perspective-
taking) mechanisms in the brain.
Recent neuroimaging evidence
indicates that race modulates affective
and cognitive components of empathic
neural response. One recent
neuroimaging study [11] found that
White and Asian participants show
increased empathic neural response
within the supplementary motor area,
ACC, and lateral frontal cortices when
perceiving a needle penetrating
a same-race face, but decreased ACCresponse when perceiving a needle
penetrating an other-race face. Another
recent neuroimaging study [12]
showed that, for Black and White
participants, empathy for ingroup
members was neurally distinct from
empathy for humankind more
generally. When observing the
emotional suffering of others, Black
and White participants recruited ACC
and bilateral AI, yet Black participants
additionally recruited MPFC when
observing the suffering of members of
their own racial group. Moreover,
neural activity within MPFC in response
to pain expressed by ingroup relative to
outgroup members predicted greater
empathy and altruistic motivation for
one’s ingroup, suggesting that
neurocognitive processes associated
with self-identity underlie extraordinary
empathy and altruistic motivation for
members of one’s own racial group.
The results of all of these studies
indicate that empathic neural response
is heightened for members of the same
race, but not those of other races. It
could be argued that as a social
species, humans have evolved for
cooperative living in social groups and
that effective cooperative living
sometimes entails belonging to smaller
social groups and limiting resource
sharing to members of that group so
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R480that individual costs and risks
associated with nonreciprocated
empathy and altruism are reduced. By
this view, enhanced empathic neural
response for same but not other races
is a consequence of group selection in
prosociality and altruistic behavior.
Nevertheless, growing evidence
indicates that racial bias in empathic
neural responses is not inevitable, but
instead results from culturally acquired
prejudice. This in turn demonstrates
flexibility in empathic neural circuitry
and highlights a pivotal role for culture
in changing how and when humans
share and respond to the suffering of
same and other races.
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Bets about Staying or MovingGrowing populations of Bacillus subtilis exhibit bistability: motile cells co-exist
with long chains of sessile cells. An epigenetic switch has been characterized
that controls the transition between the two cell types.Patrick Piggot
Motility gives bacteria the distinct
advantage of being able to move
towards good things, and away from
bad things. However, considerable
resources need to be devoted to
building flagella, becoming motile and
displaying chemotaxis. Consequently,
if local conditions are good, there is
an advantage to staying put, and not
wasting resources on these processes.
Indeed, motility is typically regulated
so that bacteria are sometimes sessile
and sometimes motile. In Bacillus
subtilis, these two types of bacterial
cell can occur successively or can
co-exist as distinct cell lineages
within a genetically homogeneous
population. A recent paper by Chai
et al. [1] elucidates the nature of
the epigenetic switch between thetwo lineages. The switch has
a double-negative feedback loop
involving protein–protein and
protein–DNA interactions.
In species such as Escherichia coli,
motility may be associated with
a particular growth phase: the bacteria
are not motile during exponential
growth in batch cultures, when the
times are good, and food is plentiful.
They become motile during the
transition to stationary phase, bad
times with starvation approaching [2].
Similar behavior is exhibited by
B. subtilis when it is grown in a rich
medium [3]. With B. subtilis, the
non-motile cells are not simply sessile,
and devoid of flagella: they are present
in long chains because separation
of the sessile cells lags far behind their
formation by cell division. This behavior
means that any switch betweennon-motile and motile is also a switch
between low and high activity of
the autolysins responsible for cell
separation. In appropriate
circumstances, motile B. subtilis can
go on to initiate formation of biofilms,
in which the bacteria have again
become sessile, and are in long
chains that are held together by
an extracellular matrix [4,5].
In the contrasting case of
Caulobacter crescentus, both motile
and sessile bacteria are present
throughout exponential growth.
Sessile, stalked bacteria grow and
divide by binary fission to give one
daughter that is motile, with the other
being sessile [6]. Thus, after every
division half the population stays and
half is able to move to better
conditions. The sessile daughter is
primed to undergo another division; the
motile daughter must first differentiate
into a sessile cell before it is able to
divide. Both sessile and motile bacteria
are also observed throughout growth
for B. subtilis when it is grown in
a minimal medium [3,7] (Figure 1).
However, the mechanism controlling
this bifurcation is very different. Within
the same growing population the two
